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The origin of human violence and warfare is controversial, some
scholars contend that inter-group conﬂict was rare until the emergence of sedentary foraging and complex socio-political organization, while others assert that violence was common and of
considerable antiquity among small-scale societies. Here we consider two alternative explanations for the evolution of human
violence: (1) individuals resort to violence when beneﬁts outweigh
potential costs, which is likely in resource poor environments, or
(2) participation in violence increases when there is coercion from
leaders in complex societies leading to group level beneﬁts. To
test these hypotheses, we evaluate the relative importance of
resource scarcity versus sociopolitical complexity by evaluating
spatial variation in three macro data sets from central California:
(1) an extensive bioarchaeological record dating from 1530 to 230
cal BP recording rates of blunt and sharp force skeletal trauma
on thousands of burials, (2) quantitative scores of sociopolitical
complexity recorded ethnographically, and (3) mean net primary
productivity (NPP) from a remotely sensed global dataset. The
results reveal that sharp-force trauma, the most common form
of violence in the record, is better predicted by resource scarcity
than relative socio-political complexity. Blunt-force cranial trauma
shows no correlation with NPP or political complexity, and may
reﬂect a different form of close-contact violence. The study provides no support for the position that violence originated with the
development of more complex hunter-gatherer adaptations in the
fairly recent past. Instead, the ﬁndings show that individuals are
prone to violence in times and places of resource scarcity.

source scarcity and competition (15-16), but adding the central
evolutionary tenant that violence should result from individual
self-interest (17-22). Given the obvious costs of engaging in
aggression, including the risk of immediate mortality and longterm reprisals, individuals should only take up violence when
the benefits (e.g., material goods, status and long-term alliances)
outweigh those costs (18-22). The benefits are more likely to
outweigh the costs when and where environmental productivity
is low, resources are scarce, and individuals have relatively more
to lose from theft (23). If individual evaluation of the costs and
benefits of lethal aggression determines the incidence of violence,
and if these evaluations vary ecologically, then (P1) we predict
that rates of lethal aggression should co-vary negatively with
environmental productivity, increasing as productivity decreases.
The second hypothesis is sociopolitical and focuses on the
group benefits of violence: even when the potential benefits of
lethal aggression do not outweigh its physical cost (of injury
or death), individuals may nevertheless risk their lives and join
other unrelated individuals in violent conflict that benefits their
sociopolitical group, if members who refuse to fight suffer significant costs of social punishment (24). If sufficiently severe,
community imposed sanctions that enforce participation in lethal
aggression, e.g., the ostracizing of cowards (24), may encourage
cooperative participation in violence at levels giving these groups
advantages over groups less able to punish, thus less capable
of violence (25-26). This implies that violence should be more
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Signiﬁcance
1.0 Introduction
Debate over the antiquity of and explanation for human violence
and warfare is longstanding and highly controversial. Two basic
alternatives have historically dominated: the Hobbesian notion
that civilization rescued humanity from a long history of "war of all
against all," and the Jean-Jacques Rousseau counter that oppression, conflict, and violence were actually caused by civilization,
and that less complex societies were marked by greater levels of
peace and harmony (1). Notwithstanding recent anthropological
studies suggesting warfare to be extremely rare among mobile
hunter-gatherers (2-7), there is undeniable ethnographic and
archaeological evidence for a long history of intergroup violence
among mobile forager societies (8-13), as exemplified by remains
from an apparent massacre of mobile foragers in Turkana during
the early Holocene and the somewhat earlier Jebel Sahaba site
in Jordan (11). Granting that violence and warfare were present
among ancient small-scale societies (14), the reasons why remain
highly debated. Current explanations for violence among huntergatherers focus on two hypotheses that emphasize the causal roles
of either resource scarcity or political complexity.
The first hypothesis focuses on environmental variables,
building on longstanding anthropological arguments about re-

From warfare to homicide, lethal violence is an all too common
aspect of the human experience, yet we still do not have
a clear explanation of why individuals kill one another. We
suggest the search for an answer should begin with an empirical understanding of where and when individuals are more
prone to experience violence. Examining patterns of lethal
trauma among hunter-gatherer populations in prehistoric central California, this study reveals that violence is explained by
resource scarcity, not political organization. This provides a
clear rationale to understand why violence may be greater in
speciﬁc times or places through human history which can help
predict where and when it may arise in the future.
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Fig. 1. Spatial distribution of (a) archaeological sites in the CCBD relative to contact-era ethnolinguistic boundaries, (b) proportion of sharp and blunt force
trauma, (c) environmental productivity (NPP), and (d) political leadership and organization summarized for each ethnolinguistic group.

common among groups with greater sociopolitical complexity,
with leaders able to enforce participation through sanctioned
punishment. This line of thinking can be linked to other longstanding anthropological hypotheses about the origins of warfare
that propose that social power differentials allow high status
individuals and leaders to coerce low status individuals to risk
their lives to provide benefits accrued by the high power elite (2730). If individuals are more likely to engage in lethal aggression
under the threat of punishment and sanction enforced by powerful leaders, then (P2) we predict that rates of lethal aggression
should covary positively with sociopolitical complexity, increasing
as complexity increases.

violence from the archaeological record, we treat these data as
a long-term record of overall violence occurring in a given area.
First, we summarize the evidence of violence occurring within the
boundaries of each ethnolinguistic group in central California.
Then, using environmental productivity as a proxy for the relative
utility of the local environment (32) and ethnographic estimates
of political complexity (33), we link the data on violence to these
ecological and ethnographic proxies in order to determine if
rates of violence are driven more by resource scarcity or political
complexity.

Here we evaluate the relative importance of resource scarcity
and sociopolitical complexity on rates of violence using an exceptionally robust archaeological database of human burials that includes remains from thousands of individuals who lived in central
California between cal 1,530 and 230 cal BP (31). Specifically,
we evaluate how two forms of violence, sharp force and blunt
force craniofacial trauma, vary relative to resource scarcity and
political complexity (Figure 1, Table S1). Because we cannot
distinguish between offensive vs. defensive violence, interpersonal vs. coalitional lethal aggression, or intra- vs. inter- group

As shown in Table 1 and Figure 2a, the proportion of individuals
suffering from sharp force trauma significantly declines with environmental productivity, confirming the first prediction (P1) that
resource scarcity increases lethal aggression. Sharp force trauma
also varies significantly with political complexity (Table 1), but
contrary to the second prediction (P2), sharp force trauma is
highest at intermediate levels of political leadership (Figure 2b)
and the extremes of political organization (Figure 2c).
Neither environmental productivity nor political organization
predicts the proportion of cases exhibiting blunt force trauma

2.0 Results

Table 1. Summary of generalized additive model results examining the effect of
environmental productivity (EP), political leadership (PL) and political organization (PO)
on the proportion of burials with evidence for sharp force trauma (SFT) and blunt force
trauma (BFT) within each ethnolinguistic group. Table shows the estimated degrees
of freedom, the proportion explained and the p-value for each dependent (Dep) and
independent (Ind) variable pair. Signiﬁcant terms are highlighted in bold.
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across the study area, suggesting that different causal factors may
be driving this type of violence (Table 1). This is supported by
significant variation between the frequency of blunt force versus
sharp force trauma that resulted in or was at least associated with
mortality; a relatively low number of blunt force trauma cases
was identified as definitively perimortem (23.53% [36/153]) with
the remainder being antemortem or indeterminate while 94.39%
(286/303) of the sharp force trauma was recorded as definitively
perimortem, likely causing or contributing to the death of the
individual.
Controlling for the potential covariance between environmental productivity and political complexity, which could conflate the interpreted cause of these relationships, shows that the
proportion of sharp force trauma varies significantly with environmental productivity alone (Table 1, Figure 3). This provides
support for the first prediction (P1) that violence is driven by
resource scarcity and suggests that political complexity has little
influence on violence independent of environmental productivity (refuting P2). As with the bivariate models, in multivariate
models the proportion of individuals who experienced blunt force
trauma does not vary significantly with any of the independent
variables (Table 1).
3.0 Discussion
Comparison of environmental productivity and sociopolitical organization relative to the skeletal record of violence over the last
1,500 years of prehistory in central California shows only one
statistically meaningful correlation: negative covariance between
sharp force or projectile trauma (the most pervasive form of violence in the record) and Net Primary Productivity (NPP). When
accounting for environmental variation, our findings provide no
indication that societies with more complex societal forms were
more prone to inter-group or inter-personal violence. While the
range of variation in sociopolitical complexity is limited in this
region relative to global variation, our California sample shows
significant levels of, and variation in, violence and further demonstrates that violence has little or nothing to do with sociopolitical
complexity, but rather environmental productivity. Sociopolitical
complexity may be a sufficient, but is not a necessary cause of
hunter-gatherer violence. Blunt force cranial trauma does not
correlate with either environmental productivity or political or-
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9.88
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ganization in the central California prehistoric record. Given that
the majority of incidents of blunt force trauma are not associated
with lethal violence, these findings suggest that it represents a
different form of close-range, inter-personal conflict occurring
in different environmental and political contexts than projectile
injuries.
In this hunter-gatherer case, environmental productivity is a
stronger predictor of heightened levels of lethal aggression than
relative socio-political complexity, supporting the notion that in
contexts of resource scarcity the perceived benefits for individuals
to engage in lethal aggression may have outweighed the perceived
costs. There are at least two ways to interpret this finding.
On the one hand, low environmental productivity could be associated with violence simply as a result of individuals experiencing more frequent resource shortfalls. When such events occur,
and possibly even when they are anticipated, individuals may find
it worthwhile to take resources or territories from their neighbors.
If such events are frequent enough, this could lead to increased
levels of violence in low productivity regions. Individuals in low
productivity environments may also be less tolerant of theft from
neighbors. Given that the utility of a resource diminishes with
the amount of that resource an individual possesses (23), those
with more may be more tolerant of theft from others, while those
with less should be less tolerant of theft. As such, resource claims
and competitions in low productivity environments should more
frequently result in episodes of violence from those intolerant
of stealing. Combined, these scenarios suggest that individuals
in lower productivity environments may experience a higher risk
of shortfall due to the lower amounts of food available within
their foraging radius; therefore, they are more likely to travel
into neighboring territories in search of resources, where they
encounter neighbors who are equally at risk of shortfall and
intolerant of theft.
On the other hand, there are also reasons to suspect that the
inverse relationship between violence and environmental productivity we report might not be due to simple resource scarcity per
se, i.e., scarcity actually experienced by individuals, as intuition
might suggest. If prehistoric populations distributed themselves
in order to maximize their rate of resource acquisition, which the
evidence suggests (32, 34), then all individuals should have the
same rate of energy gain regardless of environmental productiv-

poor environments may be equally likely to experience per capita
resource scarcity. If this is true, then the differences in violence
between resource poor vs. rich environments may not result from
differences in resource scarcity, but from how those resources
are distributed resulting in changes in mobility and territory size.
Populations in lower productivity environments have significantly
larger territories (32) and greater mobility within those territories
(34). Because individuals in low productivity environments must
travel widely in order to obtain enough resources, individuals
in these environments may operate in poorly defined territorial
boundaries, and may have less information about their neighbor’s
willingness to punish poachers, both of which may cause individuals from neighboring groups to come into conflict. In this
scenario, violence varies inversely with resource productivity as
the result of disputes resulting from either conflicting territorial claims or misunderstandings and misinformation, where low
population densities translate into widely separated groups unfamiliar with their neighbors and territorial boundaries. In these
circumstances, individuals are making optimal assessments about
how to acquire resources across a large and unproductive landscape on the basis of what little information they have regarding
their neighbors, but this has the unintended consequence of
increased violence.
Regardless of which scenario underlies the negative correlation between projectile violence and environmental productivity,
these results add to a growing body of evidence suggesting that
rates of violence across small scale societies are driven by individual evaluations of costs and benefits. Rather than arguing whether
or not violence is an ancestral or derived characteristic of human
societies, we suggest that future work should continue to examine
variation in the rates of violence across populations relative to
indicators of resource scarcity in order to explain the underlying
causes of violence throughout human history.
4.0 Methods
4.1 Data Collection
4.1.1 Central California Bioarchaeological Database

Fig. 2. Response plots illustrating signiﬁcant bivariate model results: the
effect of (a) environmental productivity, (b) political leadership and (c)
political organization on the proportion of burials exhibiting sharp force
trauma.

ity. This implies that individuals in resource rich and resource

The Central California Bioarchaeological Database (CCBD)
was assembled by one of us (Schwitalla) over the past two decades
with information gathered from 329 archaeological sites, 80% of
them excavated after 1975 because of threatened impacts from
modern development (31, 35). It includes information on a total
of 16,820 individual burials that date back as far as 5,000 cal
BP, from 19 ethnohistoric territorial delineations (31, 35). All
of these groups were relatively broad-spectrum hunter-gatherers,
organized into a large number of autonomous polities which
are often aggregated by anthropological researchers into larger
groups based on language. Three forms of violence well-attested
in the ethnographic record are evident in this sample: blunt force
cranial trauma, sharp force trauma, and trophy taking behavior.
Across the entire database, the most pervasive form of violence
is sharp force or projectile trauma, found in 7.4% of 6,278 assessed burials. It was significantly more common among males
(10.7%) than females (4.5%), and most common among young
adult males. Indicated by cutmarks, indentations, perforations on
bones, as well as embedded projectile points, this form of trauma
increased markedly in frequency during late prehistory, likely due
to the introduction of the bow and arrow (31). Blunt force cranial
trauma is the second most common form of injury, remaining
relatively constant at ca. 5% for most of prehistory for adult males
and slightly less for adult females, but increasing after 500 cal
BP. Trophy taking behavior is the practice of dismembering and
displaying body parts, and was the least common form of violence
in the CCBD, peaking 2,500 to 1,500 years ago, with 4.2% of
males and 1% of females being subjected to removal of crania or
postcranial elements. Recent research suggests that trophy-taking
may represent profoundly different underlying social and political

Fig. 3. Response plots illustrating results of two multivariate models. The ﬁrst (a) examines variation in the
proportion of burials exhibiting sharp force trauma as
a function of the combined effect of environmental
productivity and political leadership. The second (b)
examines the proportion of burials exhibiting sharp
force trauma as a function of environmental productivity and political organization. When combined,
only environmental productivity remains signiﬁcant
(Table 1).

phenomena than projectile violence and blunt force trauma (36)
so it is not further considered here.
For the current undertaking we restricted our sample to burials representing only the last 1,500 years of prehistory which are
most relevant to the ethnographic record; this subsample includes
3,939 burials assessed for sharp force trauma and 3,947 burials
assessed for blunt force cranial trauma from 127 sites (Table S1,
Figure 1).
4.1.2 Relative Sociopolitical Complexity
Relative complexity of California Native hunter-gatherer societies (37-38) was assessed for the 19 ethnolinguistic groups
represented in the CCBD with reference to two variables in
Jorgenson’s (33) Western North American Indian database.
These include (1) type and complexity of political leadership
(variable VII-A-332) and (2) government and territory (variable
VII-B-334). While these values are based on observations and
accounts of ethnographic societies, these scores should still be
representative of the general conditions experienced by individuals recorded in the CCBD given that the archaeological (39) and
linguistic (40) records suggest strongly that ethnographic patterns
likely emerged 1,500 years ago, and that groups migrating into
California had arrived in their historically-observed locations by
that time or only slightly thereafter.
Variation in political leadership was mainly between groups
with a single leader (or headman) advised by an informal council
of elders, and groups with a single leader with one or more
assistants and/or a formal council. Jorgenson’s variable VII-A-332
is formally titled “Type and Complexity of Political Leadership in
the Focal Local Community,” and has ten possible ordinal estimates for each of the ethnographic groups, but the ethnographic
groups here represent only three of these: a score of 2 represents
a single leader with at most a council of elders as additional
political offices; a score of 3 represents a single leader or headman
with one or more functional assistants and/or a formal council or
assembly, but without an elaborate or hierarchical organization.
The majority of the ethnolinguistic groups are split fairly evenly
between scores of 2 and 3. A score of 6 represents “theocratic,
authority being vested not in secular officials, but in a priesthood,
a secret society, or other religious functionaries” (33:610). This
latter form of organization was found only among the Konkow
Maidu.

Variation in political organization was mainly between social
formations consisting of just one kin group (e.g., patrilineal
bands) and formations consisting of multiple kin groups, the
units known in California as tribelets. Jorgenson variable VIIB-334 is formally titled, “Government and Territory,” with up
to 13 possible ordinal scores. The ethnolinguistic sample used
here again only represents three of these possibilities. A score
of 1 indicates a local society that has no territorial organization
larger than the residential kin group. True political organization is
lacking; a 2 is assigned where succession of the office of headman
is through appointment by a higher political authority. This is the
vast majority of the cases in our sample. A score of 3 is assigned
where the local society is composed of several residential kin
groups that are formally united into villages or bands, and these
political units are in turn combined with others to form a tribe
or district (33:611). In our sample this is found only among the
Nisenan, and even there on the basis of somewhat circumstantial
evidence (41).
4.1.3 Environmental Productivity
Environmental productivity values were taken from Codding
and Jones (32). In some cases, data on lethal aggression are
assigned more fine-grained territories than were available for the
NPP data; in such cases average NPP values are repeated for
each ethnographic group. Mean net primary productivity (NPP)
was calculated for each ethnolinguistic group from a global raster
of remotely sensed data from the MODIS instrumentation on
NASA’s Terra satellite, processed and provided by the Numerical
Terradynamics Simulation Group at the University of Montana
(42-43). NPP is an approximation of photosynthesis, measuring
the amount of energy that is turned in to mass and thereby
approximating the amount of new growth biomass available to
consumers. While a crude measure of environmental variation, it
does predict variation in hunter-gatherer demography and settlement patterns (32), suggesting that it is a reliable proxy of habitat
quality and resource abundance. Additionally, while modern data
is used here to represent the past 1,500 years, the use of modern
NPP is an appropriate proxy for past resource abundance given
the scale of our analysis and dominance of a single, specifically
Mediterranean (dry summer, wet winter), climatic pattern during the period of interest; this in contrast to other areas (e.g.,
the southern Great Basin) whose climatic history shows major

shifts between quite different (e.g., dry summer Mediterranean
vs. wet summer monsoonal) climatic regimes preventing simple
extrapolation from present to past resource abundance. Mean
NPP for our central California study area has certainly varied,
but the ranking of regions within it have remained relatively the
same. Table S1 also reports data on territory size and population
density from Codding and Jones (32), with updated territory size
estimates for subdivided Miwok and Patwin linguistic regions
following Kroeber (44-45).
4.2 Analytical Methods
To determine if each of the independent variables (environmental productivity, political complexity, and territorial organization) predicts variation in the dependent variables (the proportion of burials exhibiting sharp or blunt force trauma), we rely
on generalized additive models (GAM) (46-48). Because these
relationships may be non-linear, GAMs allow for the underlying

trends within the data to emerge without any major assumptions
by the investigator. All models employ a binomial distribution
and log link appropriate to proportional data and follow a quasilikelihood estimation to reduce the chances of over-dispersion.
In order to maximize parsimony, we minimize the degrees of
freedom (or knots) to the minimum possible (k=3). In addition to
bivariate models, we also construct multivariate models to control
for the interaction between each of the independent variables. To
account for variation in sample size, all models weight each data
point by the total number of observations (burials) from which
the proportion is calculated. Model results report the estimated
degrees of freedom (edf) of the smooth term, the proportion of
deviance explained by the inclusion of the independent variable
(also known as the likelihood r2 , or R2 L ) and the alpha or p value
associated with each independent variable.
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